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I. INTRODUCTION 
The language on the picket signs is notorious: “God Hates Fags;” “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers;” “Semper Fi, Semper Fags, Coming Home in Body Bags;” “Thank 
God for 9/11;” “God Hates the USA.” These are among the cruelest phrases 
imaginable, but they are phrases routinely utilized by the fire-and-brimstone 
fundamentalists of the Westboro Baptist Church during their picketing activities. Their 
practice of picketing the funerals of fallen United States soldiers, seamen, airmen, and 
marines is well known throughout America. Westboro members claim their purpose 
for this picketing is to “draw attention to God’s alleged hatred of homosexuality” and 
“His punishment of American citizens and servicemen for their tolerance of 
homosexuality.” Westboro protests of this nature are as prolific as the litigation they 
generate. 
Imagine now that you are a grieving father. Only a week ago, you lost your twenty-
year-old son to a tragic accident in the Iraq War. Your only wish is to bury your son 
in peace; to give a fine Marine a hero’s rest. Yet on the way to the funeral service, you 
are confronted with the abhorrent signage of the Westboro Baptist Church: thanking 
God for your dead son; calling him a “fag;” telling you he is “going to hell.” Several 
weeks later, you find reprehensible commentary about your son on the Internet, 
disparaging his name even further, on a website called “godhatesfags.com.” 
Such was the plight of Albert Snyder, father of fallen Marine Lance Corporal 
Matthew Snyder, who was killed in the line of duty in March 2006. After the Westboro 
Baptist Church picketed his slain son’s funeral, Snyder filed a lawsuit against 
Westboro alleging, inter alia, defamation, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon 
seclusion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Upon appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Phelps,1 the Court held that the speech of the 
Westboro members was protected under the First Amendment, which shielded 
Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case. In the wake of Snyder, it 
appears that bereaved parents and families of fallen American servicemen, as well as 
the grieving families of victims of violent tragedies, have no method under the law to 
redress their grievances against Westboro.   
Snyder left a major problem in its wake: how can grieving families—private 
citizens—in a time already full of the utmost emotional pain, be shielded from these 
destructive words and attacks?   
In response to the sharp rise in military funeral protests conducted by Westboro, 
and in response to Albert Snyder’s plight specifically, the federal government, over 
30 states, and numerous municipalities have enacted legislation proscribing the 
picketing of funerals in some manner—usually with content-neutral restrictions on the 
time, place, and manner of picketing. These statutes have only emboldened the scions 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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of Westboro leader, Fred Phelps, Sr. Westboro members have vowed to continue with 
their demonstrations, as well as with their lawsuits to fight statutes that they deem to 
be unfairly or unreasonably restrictive of their First Amendment rights. Generally, 
these statutes impose time restrictions keyed to the start and end of funeral services, 
as well as no-demonstration buffer zones around funerals or processions (ranging 
anywhere from 100 feet to over 1,000 feet).   
While enacted to protect grieving families of fallen soldiers in their time of greatest 
grief, these statutes do very little to assuage the anger of these families, nor to protect 
the honor of the individuals being laid to rest, nor to shield mourner’s eyes from the 
hateful—and, typically, individually targeted—messages of Westboro’s signs and 
chants. When picketing funerals, Westboro members are often merely a few hundred 
feet away from funeral services—not nearly enough distance for families to be fully 
guarded from the Westboro messages.   
Westboro pickets have spawned numerous responses, which in many instances 
involve peaceful counter-protests; however, their activities have also incited violent 
acts from onlookers and other breaches of the peace. Police are generally on-scene at 
these protests—there to protect Westboro members from the violence that would 
ensue as a result of their speech in the absence of law enforcement. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “fighting words” constitute a category of 
speech that does not enjoy protection under the First Amendment. Originally defined 
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2 “fighting words” are “those statements which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”3 
Chaplinsky represents the first and last decision in which the Supreme Court has ever 
affirmed a conviction under the “fighting words” doctrine.4 The Court has refused to 
“breathe new life into the doctrine” in a number of cases since 1942.5 
This Note avers that speech of the Westboro Baptist Church, in the context of 
funeral pickets, can be construed as targeted personal attacks on grieving families 
which have the potential to incite—and indeed have incited—immediate breaches of 
the peace and violent rebuttals. In light of Snyder, and the inadequacy of time, place, 
and manner statutes as a protection for grieving families, this Note argues for the 
revitalization of the “fighting words” doctrine to encompass targeted, ad hominem 
attacks from organizations like the Westboro Baptist Church, thereby leaving this 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment and exposing the speakers to tort liability. 
Part II.A of this Note explores the development of categories of speech deemed 
unprotected by the First Amendment, and the Roberts Court’s refusal to add new 
categories of unprotected speech. Part II.B.1 introduces the “fighting words doctrine” 
as one of these categories of unprotected speech, and Part II.B.2 discusses the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent narrowing of the doctrine. Part III.A offers a background on the 
beliefs and funeral protest activities of the Westboro Baptist Church. Part III.B 
discusses the development of Snyder v. Phelps, tracing from the protest that gave rise 
to the initial litigation through the Supreme Court’s decision. In Part IV, the argument 
in favor of revitalizing “fighting words” to curb targeted speech at funeral protests is 
                                                                                                                                         
 2 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 3 Id. at 572. 
 4 See Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Speech Clause 
with a Five-Step Analytical Framework, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 223, 256 (2000).   
 5 See id. at 257.   
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set forth, beginning with the contention that tort liability is a redress for private wrongs 
that would not necessarily have a stifling effect on free speech. Part IV.A contradicts 
scholarly arguments that the fighting words doctrine is dead or virtually nonexistent 
in current jurisprudence. Offered in Part IV.B is a brief overview of the premise that 
the state has traditionally recognized the dignitary rights of the deceased and their 
families. Justice Alito’s dissent in Snyder is discussed in Part IV.C, laying the 
groundwork for the argument that Westboro’s funeral protests constitute targeted 
speech that can be construed as fighting words. Part IV.D.1 addresses the premise that 
some of Westboro’s funeral protest speech constitutes targeted messages and ad 
hominem attacks that could fall within the “fighting words” category. Part IV.D.2 
addresses specific instances of violence against Westboro members as a result of their 
speech at funeral protests, which reinforces the argument set forth in Part IV.D.1. Part 
IV.D.3 suggests a revitalization of fighting words by refocusing inquiries on the “by 
their very utterance inflict injury” prong of the doctrine. Part IV.E addresses potential 
counterpoints. Part V offers in conclusion that the targeted opprobrious speech 
employed by Westboro at funeral protests constitutes fighting words, and should enjoy 
no First Amendment protection, so that grieving families have a method of redress in 
tort for the severe mental distress that can be caused by this hateful speech at a time 
of great emotional vulnerability. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE 
A. The First Amendment and Categories of Unprotected Speech 
The First Amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”6 It is a 
fundamental principle of the First Amendment that the government “may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”7 However, people need not hear or tolerate every message regardless 
of where it is dispatched.8 The Supreme Court has long recognized that “not all speech 
is of equal First Amendment importance.”9 The First Amendment does not provide a 
“special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.”10 As once noted by the 
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,11 “[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any 
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the 
                                                                                                                                         
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 8 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (holding prohibition on picketing was 
valid as it protected individuals who were “presumptively unwilling to receive it”). 
 9 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758, 763 
(1985) (holding that a private citizen could recover damages for common law defamation claim 
where subject of lawsuit was a matter of private concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974) (holding that First Amendment interest in protecting speech must be balanced 
against state’s interest in protecting its citizens from tortious injury). 
 10 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972). 
 11 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that 
instrument.”12  
The Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.13 Categories of speech which the Court has deemed unprotected 
include: speech which presents a clear and present danger to the public,14 speech which 
advocates imminent lawless action,15 obscenity,16 false statements,17 and fighting 
words.18 These categories of speech are denied full First Amendment protection 
                                                                                                                                         
 12 Id. at 309-10. 
 13 See generally O’Neill, supra note 4, at 251-65 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
“categorical approach” to direct regulation of speech content). 
 14 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (recognizing there is no concept of 
a total freedom of speech if speech presents a “clear and present danger” to others). Justice 
Holmes employed the infamous illustration that one yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre would 
pose a clear and present danger to others and therefore is not within the purview of First 
Amendment protection. Id.  
 15 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 485 (1969) (reversing conviction for advocating 
violence against blacks and Jews after finding Ohio statute violated First Amendment, and 
holding that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is directed to 
inciting, and is likely to incite, imminent lawless action).   
 16 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding defendant’s conviction for 
mailing obscene circulars and advertisements in violation of the federal obscenity law). The 
Court noted that any speech “having even the slightest redeeming social importance” will 
receive full constitutional protection, but obscene speech is implicitly rejected by the history of 
the First Amendment as being “utterly without redeeming social importance.” Id. at 484;  see 
also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that expression will be deemed 
obscene, and hence utterly unprotected by the First Amendment, if it satisfies the following 
elements: (1) “the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”; (2) the work “depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way” sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”). 
 17 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (“The constitutional 
guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for 
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not.”). The Court concluded that “constitutional protection does not 
turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered,”’ and 
established the onerous “actual malice” standard for public officials seeking to recover in a libel 
suit. Id. at 271, 279-80. 
 18 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 574 (1942) (upholding, against 
First Amendment challenge, a state statute that, saved by a narrowing construction, punished a 
spectrum of derisive statements no broader than “fighting words,” where the defendant called a 
city marshal “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist”); see also discussion infra Parts 
II.B.1, II.B.2. The Court acknowledged an exception to First Amendment protection for 
“fighting words,” speech which inflicts injury or tends to “incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.”   Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. The Court concluded that this type of speech is of such 
slight social value that any benefit derived from it is outweighed by the interests of order and 
morality. Id. Because New Hampshire's statute did no more than proscribe face-to-face words 
likely to cause a breach of peace, the Court upheld the statute. Id. at 573. 
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because “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,” and are of 
only “slight social value as a step to truth.”19 
Recently, under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has shown a “genuine willingness 
to be guided by early American history when interpreting the Constitution.”20 The 
Court refuses to recognize new categories of unprotected speech, unless there exists a 
longstanding historical tradition of treating the speech as unprotected.21 In United 
States v. Stevens,22 the Court stressed that it was disinclined to recognize new 
categories of free speech.23 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, stated that 
“[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution 
forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is 
not worth it.”24 Roberts suggested that “speech will be deemed categorically 
unprotected only if it has so been treated by longstanding historical tradition.”25 The 
Court reasserted its reluctance to recognize new categories of unprotected speech in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.26 This reluctance, if not an outright 
refusal, to create new categories of unprotected speech essentially means that speech 
must fall within the already-existing categories discussed above to be deemed 
unprotected by the First Amendment.   
B. The Fighting Words Doctrine 
1. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and the Advent of “Fighting Words” 
The “fighting words” doctrine stems from the Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,27 in which the Court defined “fighting words” as 
“those [statements] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
                                                                                                                                         
 19 Id. at 571-72; see also O’Neill, supra note 4, at 251. 
 20 Patrick J. Charles & Kevin F. O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary 
Origins of a “Free Press” as Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691, 
1766-67 (2012). 
 21 Id. at 1766.  
 22 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down, as substantially overbroad, a federal statute 
criminalizing depictions of animal cruelty). The Court rejected the government’s invitation to 
hold that depictions of animal cruelty are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 472. The government’s proposal involved a test to recognize new categories of 
unprotected speech, enumerated as “[w]hether a given category of speech enjoys First 
Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of speech against its 
societal costs.” Id. at 470. 
 23 See id. at 471. 
 24 Id. at 470. 
 25 Charles & O’Neill, supra note 20, at 1767. 
 26 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732, 2734 (2011) (striking down state law that banned sale and rental 
of “violent video games” to minors). The Court expressed that it would be unwilling to 
recognize any new categories of unprotected speech “without persuasive evidence that a novel 
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.” Id. 
at 2734.   
 27 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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immediate breach of the peace.”28 Chaplinsky represents the first and last decision in 
which the Supreme Court has ever affirmed a “fighting words” conviction.29 
Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, was preaching and distributing literature 
on a street in Rochester, New Hampshire, and local citizens complained to the city 
marshal that Chaplinsky was “denouncing all religion as a ‘racket.’”30 The city 
marshal informed Chaplinsky that he was well within his rights.31 A disturbance broke 
out, and the outraged crowd “treated Chaplinsky with some violence.”32 An officer 
escorted Chaplinsky toward the police station for his own protection, at which point 
Chaplinsky encountered the city marshal who originally spoke to him.33 Chaplinsky 
shouted at the marshal, “[y]ou are a God damned racketeer” and called him “a damned 
Fascist,” going on to state that “the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or 
agents of Fascists.”34 For saying these words, the city marshal arrested Chaplinsky for 
violating a New Hampshire statute that provided “[n]o person shall address any 
offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street 
or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name . . . .”35 The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the statute forbade only 
those words that “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to 
whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”36 This court described the test for 
tendency to cause violence as “what men of common intelligence would understand 
would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”37   
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
unanimously.38 Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, declared Chaplinsky’s words to 
be outside the purview of First Amendment protection: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, 
the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words—those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
                                                                                                                                         
 28 Id. at 572. 
 29 See O’Neill, supra note 4, at 256. 
 30 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569-70.   
 31 Id. 
 32 State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941). One member of the crowd allegedly 
tried to impale Chaplinsky on a flagpole; see Brief for Appellant at 3, Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 
568. 
 33 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; 1926 N.H. Laws, ch. 378, § 2. 
 36 Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758. 
 37 Id. at 762. 
 38 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568. 
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truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.39 
The Court concluded that Chaplinsky’s speech fell into the “narrowly limited class[] 
of speech” called “fighting words,” and upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction.40 
2. Post-Chaplinsky: Narrowing Fighting Words 
For nearly thirty years the Supreme Court continued to uphold the fighting words 
doctrine, yet declined to extend or apply it in every case in which it was addressed.41 
The Court began to steadily narrow the grounds on which “fighting words” are held 
to apply, beginning in 1969 with Street v. New York.42 Decided in 1971, Cohen v. 
California43 further narrowed the doctrine to apply to speech “directed to the person 
of the hearer”44 and which could be “reasonably . . . regarded [as] . . . direct personal 
                                                                                                                                         
 39 Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted). This passage has been employed to place other entire 
categories of speech outside the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753, 754 (1982) (child pornography category); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952) (group 
libel). 
 40 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72, 574.  
 41 See O’Neill, supra note 4, at 256-57; see also Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of an Insult: 
A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 402 (2005) 
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has “not affirmed a single fighting words conviction since 
Chaplinsky, but the Court has repeatedly affirmed the doctrine’s continued vitality”).   
 42 394 U.S. 576, 581 (1969) (vacating defendant’s conviction under New York flag 
desecration statute where defendant publicly burned flag in response to murder of civil rights 
leader). The Court found the statute was unconstitutionally applied as it permitted the 
punishment of merely speaking defiant words about the American flag. Id. at 578-80. The Court 
found that the defendant’s “remarks were [not] so inherently inflammatory as to come within 
that small class of ‘fighting words’ which are ‘likely to provoke the average person to 
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.’” Id. at 592 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 
at 574). 
 43 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning defendant’s breach-of-the-peace conviction for walking 
through courthouse wearing jacket with “Fuck the Draft” written on back). The Court noted that 
for speech to be constitutionally criminalized under the fighting words doctrine, the speech must 
clearly address a particular listener as opposed to the general public. Id. at 20. The Court noted 
that fighting words are “personally abusive epithets . . . likely to provoke violent reaction,” and 
rejected incitement, vulgarity, and offense to bystanders as rationales for upholding defendant’s 
conviction. Id. 
 44 Id. Michael J. Mannheimer notes that “[a]lthough the ‘directed to the person of the hearer’ 
requirement was spelled out explicitly for the first time in Cohen, the Court was actually re-
stating a thought developed in Cantwell.  This requirement went unmentioned two years later 
in Chaplinsky . . . [and] is crucial to differentiate the fighting words cases from those, like 
Cohen, in which a word is addressed to no one in particular or the world in general, and also 
from the ‘hostile audience’ cases . . . in which speech that arguably otherwise constitutes 
fighting words is addressed to a large group.” Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words 
Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1534 n.74 (1993). 
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insult[s].”45 Fighting words are thus more akin to conduct than the communication of 
ideas.46 
The Court further enumerated this restriction of the doctrine in Gooding v. 
Wilson,47 in which the majority limited the doctrine to those words “having a direct 
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is 
addressed.”48 Invoking Gooding, the Court furthered this limitation in Rosenfeld v. 
New Jersey,49 Lewis v. New Orleans,50 and Brown v. Oklahoma.51 The Court again 
declined to revitalize “fighting words” in Texas v. Johnson,52 wherein the Court 
rejected the notion that flag burning “falls within that small class of ‘fighting words’ 
that are ‘likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach 
of the peace’” or that it constituted an “invitation to exchange fisticuffs.”53   
Advocates for hate speech regulations failed to revitalize the fighting words 
doctrine in the early 1990s, with the decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.54 Striking 
down a municipal ordinance that criminalized hate speech, the Court held that the 
ordinance was flawed because it singled out a particularized list of hateful 
statements.55 According to the Court, the existence of this particularized list in the 
ordinance went “even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint 
                                                                                                                                         
 45 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
 46 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22 (examining whether “California can excise, as ‘offensive 
conduct,’ one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse” (emphasis added)); Snyder 
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also discussion infra note 
140 and accompanying text. 
 47 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (striking down a Georgia statute, which criminalized use of 
“opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace,” in the context 
of an anti-war demonstration outside an army facility). Defendant exclaimed, inter alia, “[y]ou 
son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death” and “[w]hite son of a bitch, I’ll kill you,” when being 
moved away from the protest by police officers. Id. at 519 n.1.  The majority further limited the 
scope of “fighting words” by confining it to words “hav[ing] a direct tendency to cause acts of 
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.” Id. at 524.  
 48 Id. at 524. 
 49 408 U.S. 901, 904-05 (1972) (invoking Gooding to vacate conviction for using “mother-
fucker” during public school board meeting, to describe teachers, the school board, the town, 
and county). 
 50 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (invoking Gooding to vacate mother’s conviction for calling officers 
“God damn mother fuckers” during son’s arrest). 
 51 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (invoking Gooding to vacate conviction of Black Panthers member 
for use of the word “motherfucker” at a political meeting). 
 52 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that a flag burning at protest of President Ronald 
Reagan was expressive conduct under the First Amendment, and striking down a Texas flag 
desecration statute). 
 53 Id. at 408-09. 
 54 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul ordinance that criminalized “bias-motivated 
disorderly conduct” because it singled out the public display of symbols that “arouses anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender”).   
 55 See id. at 394. 
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discrimination,”56 and it was therefore held unconstitutional.57 The Court in Virginia 
v. Black58 further affirmed that fighting words still exists as a category of unprotected 
speech by observing that the Court’s holding in R.A.V. had not banned all low-value 
speech categories such as threats or fighting words.59 
To summarize the current state of the “fighting words” category, it is essentially 
now limited to statements constituting direct personal insults or affronts,60 or 
invitations to exchange fisticuffs,61 which are individually directed at a particular 
target.62 
III. BACKGROUND: THE WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH AND SNYDER V. PHELPS 
A. The Westboro Baptist Church and Its Protest Activities 
Founded in Topeka, Kansas by disbarred attorney Fred W. Phelps, Sr. in 1955, the 
Westboro Baptist Church [Westboro] believes, among other things, that God is 
punishing America for tolerating the “sin” of homosexuality by killing Americans.63 
Indeed, the church’s predominant message is one of virulent anti-homosexuality. The 
church consists primarily, if not exclusively, of members of Phelps’ extended 
family.64   
According to its website, the church’s members engage in “daily peaceful sidewalk 
demonstrations opposing the homosexual lifestyle of soul-damning, nation-destroying 
filth” and “display large, colorful signs containing Bible words and sentiments, 
including: GOD HATES FAGS, FAGS HATE GOD, AIDS CURES FAGS, THANK 
GOD FOR AIDS, FAGS BURN IN HELL, GOD IS NOT MOCKED, FAGS ARE 
NATURE FREAKS, GOD GAVE FAGS UP, NO SPECIAL LAWS FOR FAGS, 
FAGS DOOM NATIONS, THANK GOD FOR DEAD SOLDIERS, FAG TROOPS, 
GOD BLEW UP THE TROOPS, GOD HATES AMERICA, AMERICA IS 
DOOMED, THE WORLD IS DOOMED, etc.”65 The church protesters often sing or 
chant songs, often well-known popular music with the church’s own “lyrics,” with or 
without the use of amplification devices.66   
                                                                                                                                         
 56 Id. at 391. 
 57 Id. at 377-78.  
 58 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 59 See id. at 361-62. 
 60 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
 61 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409. 
 62 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972). 
 63 See Westboro Baptist Church, About Westboro Baptist Church, GODHATESFAGS.COM, 
http://godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (Oct. 1, 2013). 
 64 Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 
575, 578 (2007). 
 65 About Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 63. 
 66 McAllister, supra note 64, at 578. 
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Westboro claims to have engaged in more than 51,000 anti-gay protests since 
1991.67 These protests and pickets have included over 600 military funerals, which 
Westboro claims were of “troops whom God has killed in Iraq/Afghanistan in 
righteous judgment against an evil nation.”68 Westboro has also protested at funerals 
of “police officers, firefighters, and the victims of natural disasters, accidents, and 
shocking crimes.”69 Westboro has protested funerals of victims of tornadoes in Joplin, 
Missouri, victims of Hurricane Katrina, and even the funerals of the innocent children 
killed in the Sandy Hook, Connecticut elementary school shooting.70 The church has 
also agreed to accept free media airtime in lieu of protesting certain funerals; notably, 
the funeral of a nine-year-old victim of the Tucson shooting spree that rendered U.S. 
Representative Gabrielle Giffords permanently disabled,71 and the funeral of five 
Amish girls murdered in their schoolhouse by a gunman.72 Westboro gained much 
notoriety for its protest of the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a homosexual man who 
was beaten to death in Wyoming because of his sexuality.73 The church maintains a 
cruel and virulently homophobic “perpetual memorial” to Matthew’s death on its 
website.74 Of note most recently, Westboro announced plans to picket the funerals of 
victims of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, thanking God for their deaths, which 
led to a petition on the White House website asking for the banning of such 
demonstrations by the church.75 
                                                                                                                                         
 67 About Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 63. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 70 See Westboro Baptist Church, Archive, GODHATESFAGS.COM, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/archive/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013); As Newtown 
Plans Burials For Shooting Victims, Westboro Baptist Church Prepares To Picket, CBS NEW 
YORK (Dec. 16, 2012), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/12/16/reports-as-newtown-plans-
burials-for-shooting-victims-westboro-baptist-church-prepares-to-picket.  
 71 See Lourdes Medrano, How Tucson Kept Westboro Baptist Church Protests Out of Town, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0114/How-
Tucson-kept-Westboro-Baptist-Church-protests-out-of-town. The church proclaimed that the 
young victim was “better off dead.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 72 See Jacques Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2006), 
www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/us/06radio.html?r=0. Shirley Phelps-Roper stated it was 
“appropriate [God] sent a pervert in to shoot those children” and that the Amish “were laid to 
an open shame because they are a false religion.” Id. 
 73 See Westboro Baptist Church, Perpetual Gospel Memorial to Matthew Shepard, 
GODHATESFAGS.COM, 
http://www.godhatesfags.com/memorials/matthewshepardmemorial.html (last visited Nov. 20, 
2013). 
 74 See id. 
 75 See Steven Nelson, Westboro Baptist Church Plans to Picket Boston Funerals, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 16, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/04/16/boston-bombing-funerals-will-
be-picketed-westboro-baptist-church-says. The church stated that the death of eight-year-old 
victim Martin Richard was God’s punishment, and that his “blood was on [society’s] hands.” 
Id. The announced funeral protest never came to fruition. 
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The Westboro Baptist Church or its members are frequently parties to litigation, 
and several of its members are trained as attorneys.76 Indeed, some of them are 
currently licensed to practice law.77 The church members go to great lengths to ensure 
that they will not be arrested when they engage in protest.78 In an effort to appear 
averse to civil disobedience, the members generally comply with law enforcement 
instructions, such as those regarding location of protest or the use of loudspeakers.79 
The church members, however, are far from apprehensive about bringing lawsuits to 
challenge restrictions placed on their protest activities, and they are quite adept at 
defending their First Amendment rights.80 
B. Background and Case History of Snyder v. Phelps 
1. The Westboro Protest of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder’s Funeral 
In Iraq on March 3, 2006, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder was killed in 
the line of duty.81 His father, Albert Snyder, selected St. John’s Catholic Church in 
Westminster, Maryland as the site for Matthew’s funeral service.82 Mr. Snyder posted 
obituary notices in local newspapers, providing notice of the location and March 10, 
2006 date of the funeral.83 Members of the Westboro Baptist Church learned of 
Snyder’s funeral and issued a news release on March 8, 2006 which announced their 
intention to travel to Maryland to picket at the funeral.84 They arrived in Westminster 
and engaged in picketing activities on March 10, 2006, outside of St. John’s Catholic 
Church.85  
Westboro’s testimony at trial established that its picketing efforts “gained 
increased attention when its members began to picket funerals of soldiers killed in 
recent years.”86 Westboro picketed Snyder’s funeral in order to “publicize their 
message of God’s hatred of America for its tolerance of homosexuality.”87 At trial, 
Westboro pastor Fred Phelps, Sr. testified that it was Westboro’s “duty” to deliver the 
                                                                                                                                         
 76 McAllister, supra note 64, at 578. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 578-79. 
 80 Id. at 579. 
 81 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. 
Supp. 2d 567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 211-12. 
 86 Id. at 211. 
 87 Id. at 212. 
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message “whether they want to hear it or not.”88 For Albert Snyder, however, this 
picketing made his son’s funeral into a “media circus for [Westboro’s] benefit.”89   
Westboro notified local police in advance of its arrival in Westminster, and at trial 
it was undisputed that Westboro had complied with all local ordinances and police 
directions with respect to maintaining a certain distance from the front of the church.90 
At trial, it was established that Westboro members had carried a mix of signage, 
ranging from general messages91 to those which could be construed as specific92 to 
Snyder’s funeral. One large sign displayed a graphic photograph of two men engaged 
in anal intercourse.93 
Westboro members staged their protest directly in front of St. John’s Catholic 
Church, and Mr. Snyder re-routed Matthew’s funeral procession to an alternate 
entrance.94 After the route was readjusted, the Snyders were still only a mere 200-300 
feet from the Phelpses and Westboro members during the procession.95 On the way to 
the funeral, “as Mr. Snyder was trying to focus on the memory of his son, he looked 
at his daughters and saw the Phelpses’ signs behind them.”96 It was later established 
through testimony that Mr. Snyder, while he saw parts of the signs on the way to 
Matthew’s funeral, did not see the entirety of their message until that evening while 
he watched a news broadcast that covered the protest.97   
Westboro posted a message on its website in the weeks following the funeral which 
contained religiously oriented denunciations of the Snyders, which gave rise to Albert 
Snyder’s defamation claim.98 The website “epic,” as the Snyders dubbed it, was 
entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-
751), 2010 WL 2145497 (“Unsurprisingly, the Phelpses’ presence turned Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral into a circus. Even according to the Phelpses’ expert, they were a ‘petty irritant.’”). 
 90 Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212. 
 91 Id. Signs expressing generalized messages included “God Hates the USA,” “America is 
Doomed,” “Pope in Hell,” and “Fag troops.” Id. 
 92 Id. “Specific” messages contained on Westboro signage included “You’re Going to Hell,” 
“God Hates You,” “Semper Fi Fags,” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.” Id. 
 93 Reply Brief for Petitioner, Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 
3167312, at *15. 
 94 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207. The protest was staged directly in front 
of St. John’s Catholic elementary school, and across the street from a public school. Id. “To 
mitigate the harm the Phelpses’ presence and activities would have on the school children, the 
school mandated that all blinds be closed, covered doors and windows facing the Phelpses with 
paper, and offered ‘excused absences’ to children whose parents chose to keep them out that 
day.” Id. at *4-5. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213-14. 
 98 Id. at 1214 n.1. 
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Westboro Baptist Church to Help the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!”99 
As discussed in Part III.B.3 below, the Supreme Court did not visit the website “epic” 
in deciding Snyder. 
2. Procedural History of Snyder v. Phelps 
In June 2006, Albert Snyder filed a diversity action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, against Fred Phelps, Sr., his daughters, and the 
Westboro Baptist Church.100 Snyder asserted five tort claims—invasion of privacy by 
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, 
publicity given to private life, and civil conspiracy.101 Contending that the First 
Amendment insulated its speech from tort liability, Westboro moved for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted as to the claims for defamation and publicity 
given to private life.102 A trial was held as to the remaining claims, and a jury awarded 
Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, 
the latter of which the District Court remitted to $2.1 million while leaving “the jury 
verdict otherwise intact.”103 
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Westboro 
again contended that the speech of its members was fully protected by the First 
Amendment, and that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.104 The 
Fourth Circuit agreed, reversing the District Court, and concluding that the statements 
on Westboro’s signage involved matters of public concern, “were not provably false, 
and were expressed solely through hyperbolic rhetoric.”105 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 2010.106 
3. United States Supreme Court Opinion 
Affirming the Fourth Circuit in an 8-1 decision, with Justice Breyer concurring 
and Justice Alito dissenting, the Court held that the speech of the Westboro Baptist 
Church was protected under the First Amendment, and that Westboro was therefore 
shielded from liability in tort.107   
                                                                                                                                         
 99 Id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he epic addressed the Snyder family directly: . . . 
‘you raised [Matthew] for the devil . . . taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to 
commit adultery . . . how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire 
world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity . . . taught Matthew to be an idolater.’”). 
 100 Id. at 1214. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. Westboro contended that the speech being challenged constituted “expressions of 
opinion, which are not actionable.” Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2009). 
Westboro asserted that their words were “clearly rhetorical, hypothetical, religious, and laced 
with opinion” and that it would be “impossible to prove or disprove these things, particularly 
given that doctrinal viewpoints drive the opinions.” Id. at 212-13.   
 103 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Snyder v. Phelps, 559 U.S. 990 (2010).   
 107 Snyder, 131 S. Ct at 1210, 1212.   
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Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell108 allowed the First Amendment to be used as a defense in state tort suits, 
including those for intentional infliction of emotional distress.109 The Court had to 
hold that Westboro’s speech was on matters of public concern in order for the First 
Amendment to prohibit holding Westboro liable in tort.110 In determining whether 
Westboro’s speech was of public or private concern, the Court examined the “content, 
form, and context” of the speech “as revealed by the whole record.”111 The Court 
determined that the “‘content’ of Westboro’s signs plainly relat[ed] to broad issues of 
interest to society at large, rather than matters of ‘purely private concern.’”112 The 
Court reached this conclusion by finding that the issues highlighted by Westboro113 
were matters of public import, and that the Westboro signage was designed to reach 
as broad a public audience as possible.114 The Court found the fact that some of 
Westboro’s signs were viewed as being directed specifically at the Snyders was 
inconsequential to the “public versus private concern” inquiry, stating that the “overall 
thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public 
issues.”115 The Court also held that the context of the Westboro picket, though 
designed to desecrate the private funeral of a fallen Marine, could not remove First 
Amendment protection.116 
It bears mentioning that the fact that Albert Snyder had proven the rigorous 
standard of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort117 was not contested at 
                                                                                                                                         
 108 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 109 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215. It is worth noting that neither Snyder nor Hustler held that the 
First Amendment per se trumps a private citizen’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. See id.; see also Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46. 
 110 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)) (“[S]peech on ‘matters of public concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of 
the First Amendment’s protection.’”). Where matters of purely private significance are at issue, 
First Amendment protections are less rigorous. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758) 
(finding that where speech on private matters is restricted, “there is no potential interference 
with a meaningful dialogue of ideas” and the “threat of liability” does not pose the risk of a 
“reaction of self-censorship on matters of public import”). 
 111 Id. at 1216 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761). The Court examines “what was 
said, where it was said, and how it was said.” Id. 
 112 Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759). 
 113 “[T]he political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our 
Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy.” Id. at 1217. 
 114 Id. at 1217. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. (noting that Westboro’s signs were “displayed on public land next to a public street” 
and that this reflected the fact that Westboro “finds much to condemn in modern society,” such 
that the funeral setting did not alter the conclusion that the speech was on matters of public 
concern). 
 117 The defendant(s) must, intentionally or recklessly, engage in extreme and outrageous 
conduct that causes the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. 
Supp. 2d 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008) (citing Miller v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 
831, 839 (D. Md. 2000)). The jury at trial had “sufficient evidence before it to conclude that 
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the Supreme Court level.118 Westboro “abandoned any effort to show” that the 
elements of the emotional distress tort were not met, choosing not to contest the 
sufficiency of the evidence found at trial.119 
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court did not consider the website 
“epic”120 when reviewing Snyder’s claims.121 The Court found that, although the epic 
was properly submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts below, Snyder had never 
mentioned the website epic in his petition for certiorari, and therefore the epic was not 
properly before the Court and could not factor into its analysis.122 
IV. ANALYSIS 
When the First Amendment was conceived, its drafters drew upon notions of 
liberty and responsibility—rather than upon license123—and so the First Amendment 
should not immunize an “intentional[] . . . attack”124 on a private person where a jury 
finds liability under state tort law. Tort law was designed to compensate for injuries 
brought about by private wrongs that the Constitution gives a defendant no privilege 
to commit.125 Thus, tort suits are not vehicles of public outrage; rather, tort law serves 
as a tool for the redress of private individual wrongs that damage unwilling victims.126 
The public discourse under the First Amendment “should not be understood as a realm 
in which all standards of civility and respect have been suspended.”127 The right to 
                                                                                                                                         
[Albert Snyder] had suffered ‘severe and specific’ injuries” as a result of Westboro’s speech at 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral and its website epic. See id. at 180-81. The author notes that Albert 
Snyder proved the elements of the tort despite having the added burden of showing that his 
severe emotional distress was not simply attributable to his son’s death alone; that is, he had to 
show that he suffered additional severe emotional distress because of Westboro’s conduct. 
 118 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 119 Id. 
 120 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
 121 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 n.1.  
 122 Id. (“The epic is not properly before us and does not factor into our analysis.”). 
 123 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“[T]hough this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License; 
though Man in that State have an unconroleable [sic] Liberty to dispose of his Person or 
Possessions, yet he has not Liberty to destroy himself . . . that being all equal and independent, 
no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”); Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985) (recognizing the “basic concept of 
the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent 
system of ordered liberty”); Michael I. Krauss, A Marine’s Honor: The Supreme Court from 
Snyder to Alvarez, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 15 (2012); see also infra note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
 124 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 125 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (holding that private citizen could recover 
damages for common law defamation claim where subject of lawsuit was a matter of private 
concern); see also Krauss, supra note 123, at 15. 
 126 See Krauss, supra note 123, at 1. 
 127 Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, Public Discourse, and 
the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101, 107 (2012). Professor Heyman contends that the 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/10
2015] CAN DEAD SOLDIERS REVIVE A “DEAD” DOCTRINE? 759 
 
commit a wrong against a private person in order to make a political or religious 
statement should be no more permissible under the First Amendment than would be 
the right to shoot someone to make a statement about the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms.128   
Time, place, and manner statutes restrictive of funeral protests129 have perhaps 
mitigated the effects of Westboro’s distasteful signage on grieving families, but these 
statutes arguably do nothing to remedy the injuries inflicted upon these families by 
Westboro’s speech.130 Indeed, Westboro has vowed to continue its protests despite 
these new legal restrictions.131 In light of these facts, the Supreme Court’s reluctance 
to create new categories of unprotected speech,132 and the Snyder Court’s near-
absolutist protection of Westboro’s First Amendment rights, the remainder of this 
Note argues that Westboro should be exposed to tort liability by deeming Westboro’s 
targeted messages unprotected under a revitalized fighting words doctrine. 
A. The Fighting Words Doctrine Is Not Dead 
Though commentators seeking the abolition of the fighting words doctrine have 
“seized on the fact that the Supreme Court has not affirmed a single fighting words 
conviction” since Chaplinsky,133 the doctrine is not entirely dead,134 as some scholars 
                                                                                                                                         
“root problem with the Supreme Court’s approach [in Snyder] is that it fails to recognize that 
all of the values of a democratic society are ultimately founded on respect for the freedom and 
dignity of human beings.” Id. at 129. This idea is “rooted in the Lockean natural rights tradition, 
which deeply influenced the adoption of the Bill of Rights.” Id.; see also supra note 123 and 
accompanying text. 
 128 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). This point is given credence by 
the hypothetical situation presented in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion. Id.; see also Krauss, 
supra note 123, at 15; see also infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 129 See discussion in Introduction supra Part I. 
 130 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is apparent . . . that the enactment 
of these laws is no substitute for the protection provided by the established IIED tort . . . there 
is absolutely nothing to suggest that Congress and the state legislatures, in enacting these laws, 
intended them to displace the protection provided by the well-established IIED tort.”). Justice 
Alito recognized that the Maryland law, enacted after the Snyder funeral protest, would not have 
changed the situation, as Westboro would have been acting in compliance with its restrictions. 
Id. Justice Alito noted “the verbal attacks that severely wounded [Snyder] in this case complied 
with the new Maryland law regulating funeral picketing.” Id.  
 131 See Paige Lavender, Westboro Baptist Church Vows to Defy Rules After Congressional 
Smackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2012, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/04/westboro-baptist-church-_n_1741963.html (“Steven 
Drain, spokesman for Westboro, told CNN the new restrictions were ‘really not going to change 
our plans at all.’ ‘We’re going to continue to [protest],’ Drain said.”). 
 132 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 133 Friedlieb, supra note 41, at 402; see also discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 134 Contra, e.g., Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 
536 (1980) (describing the fighting words doctrine as “nothing more than a quaint remnant of 
an earlier morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free 
expression” and “not constitutionally justifiable”). Gard dismissed the common justification 
that the doctrine protects a private individual from being insulted by another private individual, 
calling it an “improbable supposition.” Id. at 580. Gard contends that the “interest in preventing 
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contend. As discussed in Part II.B.2 above, the doctrine has indeed not been applied 
to uphold any convictions since Chaplinsky; nonetheless, though it has been 
narrowed135 enough to warrant at least some criticism of its viability,136 the doctrine 
is still alive in First Amendment jurisprudence.   
The Supreme Court’s affirmation in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul that fighting words 
remain unprotected by the First Amendment demonstrates the weakness of the 
scholarly contention that the fighting words doctrine is “dead.”137 While the Court did 
strike down the fighting words statute at issue in the case, the Court stated that “the 
reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First 
Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their 
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of 
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”138 It is also noteworthy that, 
while no Supreme Court cases have affirmed convictions since Chaplinsky, “fighting 
words cases are generally prosecuted by the states, and state appellate and supreme 
courts have repeatedly affirmed fighting words convictions.”139   
Furthermore, Snyder v. Phelps itself contravenes any contention that the fighting 
words doctrine has met its demise. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion cited 
Chaplinsky and addressed fighting words by employing a hypothetical situation.140 
                                                                                                                                         
minor indignation and hurt feelings is too trivial for the law’s cognizance.” Id. at 581. The 
effects of the speech at issue in Snyder, however, clearly surpass mere “minor indignation and 
hurt feelings,” and it bears mentioning that much of the scholarly criticism of the fighting words 
doctrine preceded Snyder and the phenomenon of funeral picketing.  
 135 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 136 See Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 551-
52 (2004). Professor Caine opined that the Supreme Court has “worn down the fighting words 
doctrine into a shadow of itself.” Id. Caine cites as evidence fact that the “words whose very 
utterance inflict injury” prong of the doctrine has been largely ignored by the Court and has 
been virtually abandoned. See id. Because of this, Caine argues that the “chill” that Chaplinsky 
poses under present doctrine demands “univocal repeal.” See id. Again, it is noteworthy that 
Caine’s article preceded the Court’s decision in Snyder and the phenomenon of funeral 
picketing. Furthermore, Caine’s treatment of the “words whose very utterance inflict injury” 
prong is addressed infra Part IV.D.3. 
 137 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 138 Id. at 393. Though the Court did strike down the statute at issue on grounds of content-
based discrimination, the fact that the Court addressed the fighting words doctrine in this manner 
implies that the fighting words doctrine is still alive and well. See Friedlieb, supra note 41, at 
402 (stating that the Court has “repeatedly affirmed the doctrine’s continued vitality—most 
recently in R.A.V.”).   
 139 Friedlieb, supra note 41, at 402; see also, e.g., People v. Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Estes v. State, 660 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App. 1990); State v. Read, 680 A.2d 
944 (Vt. 1996). Friedlieb notes that, as such crimes are ordinarily misdemeanors carrying light 
penalties, many defendants “likely opt not to spend the time or money challenging convictions 
for fighting words offenses.” Friedlieb, supra note 41, at 402 n.84.  This results in “the number 
of cases at the appellate level likely drastically underreflect[ing] the number of cases at the trial 
court level and even more so the number of arrests on fighting words-related charges.” Id. 
 140 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer 
employed a hypothetical situation illustrative of fighting words: “Suppose that A were 
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Justice Alito directly addressed fighting words and Chaplinsky in his dissent.141 
Addressing Justice Alito’s “attempt[] to draw parallels between [Snyder] and 
hypothetical cases involving defamation or fighting words,”142 Chief Justice Roberts 
noted that there was “no suggestion that the speech at issue falls within one of the 
categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as those for obscenity 
or ‘fighting words.’”143 This statement indicates that, although the Court did not find 
that Westboro’s speech was outside the scope of First Amendment protection under 
fighting words, the fighting words category is still good precedent, and the doctrine is 
still “alive.”144   
In the face of legal scholars’ contentions that the doctrine is virtually dead,145 and 
their calls for the doctrine’s abolition,146 the Supreme Court “has not indicated the 
slightest interest in eliminating the doctrine,”147 and thus the fighting words doctrine 
remains as valid precedent within First Amendment jurisprudence.148 
B. The State Traditionally Protects the Dignity of the Deceased and the Dignitary 
Rights of the Bereaved Family 
American law recognizes a number of dignitary rights of the family of the 
deceased. For instance, in cases where a corpse has been mistreated in some manner, 
                                                                                                                                         
physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an 
opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern.  The 
constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield A’s use of unlawful, unprotected 
means.” Id.  Invoking fighting words, Justice Breyer concluded by noting that, in some cases, 
the use of “certain words as means would be similarly unprotected” by the First Amendment. 
Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
 141 See id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 142 Id. at 1215 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 143 Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 218 n.12 (4th Cir. 2009)).   
 144 This is further supported by the justices’ questions during oral arguments in Snyder. Some 
of the justices asked whether fighting words, as a category of unprotected speech, could only 
be directed to an individual literally capable of resorting to violence.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 32, Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2010/09-751 (“JUSTICE ALITO: ‘Well, 
it’s an older—it’s an elderly person.  She’s really probably not in—in a position to punch this 
person in the nose.’ JUSTICE SCALIA: ‘And she’s a Quaker, too.’”). 
 145 See supra notes 134 & 136. 
 146 See generally Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fighting the Fighting Words Standard: A Call for 
Its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (2000) (arguing for destruction of doctrine, or, in the 
alternative, offering solutions to the problems posed by the fighting words doctrine in its present 
form); Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its 
Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129 (1993) (arguing for elimination of fighting words doctrine 
as “manifest[ing] anachronistic male bias” and “enabl[ing] officials to use discretionary power 
to harass minorities or suppress dissident speech”); Caine, supra note 136 (averring that the 
Supreme Court has “worn down the fighting words doctrine into a shadow of itself”). 
 147 Friedlieb, supra note 41, at 402.   
 148 See Reilly, supra note 146, at 984 (noting that though, as presently conceived, the fighting 
words doctrine has “limited utility,” it “survives with the approval of the Supreme Court and 
continues to be cited as a valid aspect of American jurisprudence”). 
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the family of the deceased may be able to recover for negligence, or intentional or 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.149 The family may also be able to assert a 
right to privacy. Justice Anthony Kennedy once noted that “[f]amily members have a 
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted 
public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites 
and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once their own.”150 
States also traditionally have strict regulations for funeral directors and crematories, 
which are enacted for the purpose of protecting the dignity of the deceased and the 
burial rights of the family. 
C. Justice Alito’s Solitary Dissent in Snyder 
Justice Samuel Alito was the only member of the Court who believed that the facts 
in Snyder mandated an in-depth inquiry as to the targeted nature of the protest at issue. 
Alito also recognized that the First Amendment does not function as a near-absolute 
license providing speakers immunity from liability where their speech causes injury, 
noting that the speech at issue contained both matters of public and private concern.151 
Justice Alito’s dissent began with a phrase implicitly evoking fighting words—
“[o]ur profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the 
vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case”152—a theme that resonates through 
his opinion.153 Prior to explicitly citing the fighting words doctrine and Chaplinsky, 
Justice Alito aptly recognized that “it is clear that the First Amendment does not 
entirely preclude liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by means 
of speech,”154 and noted that the Court had previously recognized that words may “by 
their very utterance inflict injury.”155 Justice Alito continued: 
The First Amendment does not shield utterances that form “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step 
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”156 
                                                                                                                                         
 149 See Heyman, supra note 127, at 156 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 362 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 150 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (holding that 
photographs of suicide victim’s body were exempt from disclosure under Freedom of 
Information Act as “constitut[ing] an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); see also 
Heyman, supra note 127, at 156. 
 151 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 152 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 153 See id. at 1222-28. 
 154 Id. at 1223. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Justice Alito also 
referenced a similar sentiment from Cantwell v. Connecticut.  Id. (citing Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (“[P]ersonal abuse is not in any proper sense 
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.”)). 
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Calling Westboro’s speech a “brutal[] attack[]” on Matthew Snyder, Justice Alito 
stated that “[w]hen grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack like 
the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery.”157 
This evokes the premise that tort law is designed as a vehicle for the redress of private 
individual wrongs that damage unwilling victims.158 
Justice Alito noted that Westboro could have chosen to stage its protest at a variety 
of different locations,159 but it chose Matthew Snyder’s funeral because it was 
“expected that [Westboro’s] verbal assaults w[ould] wound the family and friends of 
the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who 
are visibly in grief.”160 Justice Alito mentioned this publicity-seeking strategy, as well 
as the press release that Westboro issued,161 as indicative of Westboro’s speech being 
a targeted attack on the Snyders.162 
Contrary to the Court’s holding that the context of Westboro’s speech did not alter 
the First Amendment’s protection thereof,163 Justice Alito contended that Westboro’s 
choice to protest at Snyder’s funeral in lieu of any of the “other countless available 
venues” would lead any reasonable person to assume that there was a connection 
between the messages on the placards and the deceased.164 Continuing with his 
characterization of the protest as an attack on the Snyders, Alito again contradicted 
the majority’s contextual argument by stating that, in the context of a funeral, those 
signs that could be construed as directed at the Snyders165 would likely be “interpreted 
as referring to God’s judgment of [Matthew Snyder].”166 Alito furthered his argument 
that Westboro had intentionally attacked the Snyders by recognizing that other signage 
could have been construed as falsely suggesting that Matthew Snyder was a 
                                                                                                                                         
 157 Id.; cf. id. at 1220 (majority opinion) (conceding that the “contribution [of Westboro’s 
funeral protest] to public discourse may be negligible”). 
 158 See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. 
 159 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that Westboro could have 
protested at, inter alia, the United States Capitol, the White House, Supreme Court, or Pentagon, 
or at the Maryland State House or the United States Naval Academy, where Westboro had been 
earlier in the day).  
 160 Id. Alito continued: “The more outrageous the funeral protest, the more publicity the 
Westboro Baptist Church is able to obtain.” Id. 
 161 The press release stated that Westboro was going to “picket the funeral of Lance Cpl. 
Matthew Snyder. He died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God . . . Now in 
Hell—sine die.” Id. at 1225. 
 162 Id. at 1225 (“This announcement guaranteed that Matthew’s funeral would be 
transformed into a raucous media event and began the wounding process.”). Recall that the 
Court has previously recognized that families “have a personal stake in honoring and mourning 
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own 
grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord” to their deceased. Nat’l 
Archives & Records Admin v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004); see also supra Part IV.B. 
 163 See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 164 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 165 See supra note 92 and text accompanying. 
 166 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2015
764 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:743 
homosexual, and that a reasonable bystander could have likely concluded that the 
signs were meant to suggest such a sentiment in a derogatory fashion.167 
As discussed in Part III.B.3, the Court in Snyder did not consider Westboro’s 
website “epic” that derided Matthew Snyder and his family, as it was not properly 
included in Snyder’s petition for certiorari.168 Justice Alito, however, used the 
language of this epic as further evidence that Westboro intended to specifically attack 
Matthew Snyder and his family, as well as evidence that Westboro’s speech at issue 
went “far beyond commentary on matters of public concern.”169 Alito recognized that 
the Snyders were private citizens, and that while speech regarding the Catholic Church 
or the United States military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, anything 
regarding Matthew Snyder’s private conduct could not constitute the same.170 
The overarching theme of Alito’s opinion recognizes that there has never been a 
Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment per se trumps a private 
citizen’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.171 The First 
Amendment was enacted to ensure a free interchange of ideas, and the fact that a 
group’s speech involves matters of public concern does not, and should not, in and of 
itself trump a private citizen’s interests. Permitting a targeted victim, such as Albert 
Snyder, to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress would not “stifle or chill 
speech,” nor would that be the goal.172 Allowing these tort suits would “merely hold 
speakers liable when they purposefully target and exploit particularly vulnerable 
individuals with what are arguably unprotected ‘fighting words’ that cause severe 
emotional distress.”173 Professor Levinson noted that, in countries that have gone a 
step further and criminalized hate speech, “none of the posited adverse effects, such 
as making repressed speakers more dangerous, has occurred.”174 
                                                                                                                                         
 167 See id.  
 168 See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
 169 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 170 See id. 
 171 See Krauss, supra note 123, at 16. Krauss noted that the Supreme Court of Albany 
County, New York provides an excellent illustration of this point: “The First Amendment was 
not enacted to enable wolves to parade around in sheep’s clothing, feasting upon the character, 
reputation, and sensibilities of innocent private persons. It was enacted to assure a free 
interchange of ideas.” Id. at 16 n.92 (citing Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broad., Inc., 654 N.Y.S.2d 
259, 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996)). 
 172 See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted Hate Speech and the First Amendment: How the 
Supreme Court Should Have Decided Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45, 76 (2013). Levinson 
expressed a similar conclusion as a counter to the assertion that “restricting hate speech will not 
stop hatred; it simply drives the expression underground where it becomes more dangerous.” 
Id.  
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 76 n.228. Levinson referred to Canada and “many European countries” as examples 
of this premise. Id. (citing Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate 
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 216-17 (1991) (“Other countries that have 
adopted group libel laws, including Canada and Great Britain, have not reported a catastrophic 
erosion of civil liberties or free speech.”)).  
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss3/10
2015] CAN DEAD SOLDIERS REVIVE A “DEAD” DOCTRINE? 765 
 
It should be recognized that retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens stated 
that he would have “joined [Alito’s] powerful dissent in the recent case holding that 
intentional infliction of severe emotional harm is constitutionally protected 
speech.”175 Stevens was the last sitting member of the Supreme Court who was also 
a military veteran.176 Stevens borrowed a phrase from Justice Alito, stating that “the 
First Amendment does not transform solemn occasions like funerals into ‘free-fire 
zones.’”177 Stevens also noted that Snyder did not involve a cartoon about a public 
figure, as was at issue in Hustler; rather, it involved a verbal assault on private citizens 
attending the funeral of their Marine corporal son.178 
Alito readily recognized that while Westboro’s speech was predominantly on 
matters of public concern,179 its speech was also peppered with “actionable 
speech.”180 Simply because the vast majority of Westboro’s protest involved matters 
of public concern does not mean that it should have been afforded absolute freedom 
from liability. “The First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that 
are interspersed with non-defamatory statements on matters of public concern, and 
there is no good reason why [Westboro’s] attack on Matthew Snyder and his family 
should be treated differently.”181 Thus, Snyder should have been allowed recovery 
for, at minimum, any injury caused by signage that could have been reasonably 
interpreted as being directed at the Snyder family. These messages of private concern 
were not worthy of First Amendment protection. 
D. Funeral Protests Call for Revitalization of the Fighting Words Doctrine 
1. Westboro’s Signage Includes Targeted Ad Hominem Attacks on Grieving Families 
a. Targeted Attack of Matthew Snyder and His Family 
Just as Justice Alito asserted, a reasonable person would likely conclude that, when 
displayed on signs outside a private military funeral, the following messages would 
be construed as directed specifically at the grieving family: “You’re Going to Hell;” 
“God Hates You;” “Semper Fi Fags;” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”182 The 
Supreme Court deserves commendation for at the very least admitting that this 
                                                                                                                                         
 175 Jonathan H. Adler, Stevens Hearts Alito, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2011, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2011/05/06/stevens-hearts-alito. 
 176 Krauss, supra note 123, at n.86. 
 177 See Adler, supra note 175. 
 178 Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the Federal Bar Council Annual Law Day Dinner 
(May 3, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/Federal%20Bar%C20Council%C20Annual
%C20 Law %C20Day%Dinner(1613_001).pdf). Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the 
Federal Bar Council Annual Law Day Dinner (May 3, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/speeches.aspx).  
 179 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011). The majority immunized Westboro 
from tort liability because the “overall thrust and dominant theme of [their] demonstration spoke 
to” issues of public concern. Id. 
 180 Id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
 181 Id. 
 182 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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material might have easily been construed as not involving matters of public 
concern.183 However, the Court neglected to address Justice Alito’s desired 
holding184—the Court should have addressed the possible ramifications of Westboro 
stating to the Snyders that the deceased was “going to hell” and that he was hated by 
God.  Instead, the Court held that the funeral setting did not alter the fact that 
Westboro’s speech was on matters of public concern.185  If, indeed, Westboro’s 
speech on matters of purely private concern would have been actionable but for their 
comments on matters of public concern, it is “not clear jurisprudentially why their 
comments on matters of public concern should have had an immunizing effect.”186   
Though delivered with considerable opprobrium, Westboro’s speech, as it 
regarded the conduct and fate of America, was indeed not actionable; however, the 
Court misconstrued the funeral picket in Snyder when it concluded that Westboro was 
merely trying to communicate with the public about America’s moral decline. 
Westboro directed its picketing specifically toward the Snyders and those mourning 
Matthew’s death, as well as to the state and nation as a whole. Taken together, the 
Westboro news release regarding its intent to protest, the protest speech itself, and the 
website epic, indicate Westboro’s intent for the protest; namely, to condemn the 
Snyder family for the way they raised Matthew, and to rejoice in Matthew’s death. 
Westboro callously used the Snyder family, against their will and at a time of great 
sorrow, as a platform. The messages addressed to the Snyders were meant to subject 
them to public contempt, with an aim to discourage others from following their 
allegedly poor moral example.187 Westboro admits, and even celebrates, the fact that 
it directs its signs and messages at individual people to use them as examples.188 Thus, 
at minimum, the “You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You” signs189 were as much 
ad hominem attacks on the Snyders as they were purportedly comments on society at 
large, especially in the context of Matthew’s private funeral.   
                                                                                                                                         
 183 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (2011); see also Mark Strasser, Funeral Protests, Privacy, 
and the Constitution: What Is Next After Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 325 (2011). 
 184 Justice Alito would have held that the First Amendment “permits a private figure to 
recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of 
private concern.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 185 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Strasser, supra note 183, at 325. 
 187 See Westboro Baptist Church, If God Hates Homosexuals as a Group, Why Do You 
Sometimes Aim Signs at Individual People, Not at the Group? How Can You Say That an 
Individual Is In Hell?, GODHATESFAGS.COM, http://godhatesfags.com/faq.html#individuals 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2014).   
 188 See id. Westboro believes that this personal targeting constitutes some version of Biblical 
“love,” albeit a backward one, and cites the Book of Timothy as evidence that warning people 
about their “immorality” is a necessary form of “love.” See id. (citing 1 Timothy 5:20 (“Those 
that sin, rebuke before all that others also may fear [God]”)). 
 189 While the word “you” could indeed be construed in the plural form to address a group of 
people, such as the bystanders for the Snyder funeral and protest, it can just as easily be 
construed in the singular form, as an address directed at Matthew and the Snyders themselves. 
When viewed in light of Westboro’s admission that it directs signs and messages at individuals, 
see id., it is entirely plausible and reasonable to construe the signs at issue in Snyder as being 
directed specifically at Matthew Snyder and his family. 
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The Supreme Court held that the funeral setting did not alter the fact that 
Westboro’s speech was on matters of public concern, throwing much weight behind 
the fact that Westboro members were on public land during the protest.190 The Court 
dismissed the plausible contention that a private funeral alters the context of the 
speech,191 simply because the speech was on public property and purportedly 
contained messages of public concern. The proximity of the protest to the funeral 
service should have been granted more consideration, as it certainly altered the way 
that Westboro’s messages were construed. Matthew Snyder was clearly the only 
deceased person in the immediate area of the protest. “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” 
may facially appear to be a generalized message, but when considered in the context 
of the funeral setting, where Matthew was the only deceased soldier present, it could 
just as easily be considered an expression of jubilation and gratitude for the death of 
Matthew Snyder, specifically.192 By that same token, those present could have easily 
thought that, in the context of the funeral and its attendant religious rites, Matthew 
was the target of “You’re Going to Hell.” 
The website “epic” was most indicative of Westboro’s specific targeting of 
Matthew Snyder and his family. The Court, as mentioned in Part III.B.3 above, did 
not consider the epic in its opinion because it was not included in Albert Snyder’s 
petition for certiorari. Justice Alito viewed the majority’s elimination of the epic as an 
error. In his dissent, Alito opined that the epic was not merely “a distinct claim, but a 
piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability for the claims now 
before this Court.”193 Alito continued by stating that “[t]he protest and the epic are 
parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.”194 When taken individually, the epic arguably falls more in line 
with a direct verbal assault on the Snyders than do the signs held by Westboro 
members; however, the Court’s refusal to consider the epic in its opinion avoided a 
truly full and exhaustive examination of the speech in its “content, form, and context 
. . . as revealed by the whole record.”195 By avoiding consideration of the epic on a 
technicality, and ignoring the status of Albert Snyder as a private citizen, the Court 
was able to narrow its holding considerably and confine it solely to Westboro’s rights 
to engage in speech on matters of public concern while on public property. Had the 
epic been examined by the Court and coupled with the speech during the protest, the 
Court could have determined that the speech was targeted, and that it spoke more to 
                                                                                                                                         
 190 See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 191 This despite prior recognition that families have a personal stake in objecting to 
unwarranted public exploitation that intrudes upon their grief and degrades the respect they seek 
to accord to their deceased. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 192 Indeed, Albert Snyder construed this sign in exactly that manner. See Heyman, supra note 
127, at 122. 
 193 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1226 n.15 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (emphasis 
added). 
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matters of private concern.196 In this way, Westboro may have narrowly escaped 
exposure to liability and a curtailing of their speech. 
Westboro’s speech created an “atmosphere of confrontation.”197 In light of the 
above evidence, it is reasonable to consider that Westboro’s speech was “directed at 
the person of the hearer”198 (the “hearer” being Albert Snyder), and that certain speech 
by Westboro could be reasonably construed as “direct personal affronts”199 to Albert 
Snyder and his family. 
b. Targeted Attacks on Other Victims of Violent Tragedy 
It is necessary to reiterate a point of discussion from Part III.A above—that 
Westboro’s protest activities are not limited to the funerals of military servicemen.200 
Matthew Snyder’s family is not the first, nor will it be the last, to be unwillingly 
targeted while celebrating the life of their deceased. For instance, Westboro has also 
targeted victims of violent and shocking tragedies, such as the Sandy Hook elementary 
school shootings and the Boston Marathon bombing, or the savage beating of Matthew 
Shepard.201 All Westboro funeral protests are generally conducted in similar fashion, 
with an initial targeted announcement of Westboro’s intent to protest followed by the 
protest itself, which is frequently accompanied by a website “epic” similar to the one 
employed by Westboro to target the Snyders.202 It can be inferred that almost no group, 
outside of Westboro itself, is immune from Westboro’s targeted protest attacks at 
funerals. 
2. Westboro’s Protest Speech Incites Acts of Violence and Could Be Reasonably 
Expected to Incite Violence from Grieving Families 
As discussed above, Westboro typically notifies local police of its intended 
protests and coordinates location and time with local departments, just as they did for 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral.203 The presence of police officers is necessary to keep 
general order, as Westboro’s protests usually draw attention and crowds; however, the 
police are even more necessary to shield Westboro members from physical attacks, 
which would be inevitable in the absence of police protection. As Westboro protests 
are generally well-guarded by law enforcement personnel, the documented instances 
of violence arising from these protests are few, but there are enough to demonstrate 
the potential that Westboro’s speech has to incite or invite physical violence. There 
are also examples of physical violence perpetrated by Westboro members themselves. 
                                                                                                                                         
 196 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). In recognizing that the Court’s 
holding addressed only picketing on matters of public concern, and not on the effect of television 
broadcasting or internet postings, Justice Breyer implied that, had the Court considered the 
website epic, the entire outcome of Snyder would have been different. See id. 
 197 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008). 
 198 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
 199 Id. 
 200 See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.  
 201 See supra text accompanying notes 67-75. 
 202 See, e.g., supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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Protesting outside the Vintage Restaurant in Topeka, Kansas on March 26, 1993, 
Westboro members were accosted by passersby who took offense to their extreme 
protest speech.204 Eight Westboro members were hospitalized with a variety of minor 
injuries.205 In 2003, elderly Westboro member Charles Hockenbarger, carrying a 
protest sign that read “Thank God for September 11,” was badly beaten by an 
unknown assailant and later hospitalized.206 On May 21, 2006, Westboro members 
were protesting a Marine’s funeral in Seaford, Delaware, and were forced to flee in a 
police van for their own safety.207 Though police were positioned between Westboro 
protesters and the large crowd of counter-protesters, one counter-protester broke 
through the police line and assaulted two Westboro members.208 As the Westboro 
members were carted away by police, several counter-protesters threw eggs, stones, 
and bottles at the vehicle, breaking several windows.209 On November 30, 2010, 
Wichita, Kansas police arrested double-amputee Army veteran Ryan Newell for 
felony conspiracy to commit aggravated battery.210 Newell was sitting in his parked 
SUV outside a meeting of Westboro members with loaded firearms and ammunition 
in the vehicle.211   
A counter-protester spit upon Shirley Phelps-Roper in January 2008 while 
protesting at Marine Corps Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina following 
the murder of Lance Cpl. Maria Lauterbach.212 In yet another incident, while protesting 
a memorial in Joplin, Missouri for victims of a deadly tornado in May 2011, a 
Westboro member attempted to break through a counter-protest staged by a group of 
bikers called the “Patriot Guard Riders,” but was accosted and prevented from 
                                                                                                                                         
 204 U.S. Domestic Terrorism: Westboro Baptist Church, CTR. FOR GRASSROOTS OVERSIGHT, 
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=us_domestic_terrorism_tmln&haitian_
elite_2021_organizations=us_domestic_terrorism_tmln_westboro_baptist_church&printerfrie
ndly=true (last visited Feb. 4, 2015)  [hereinafter Domestic Terrorism]. 
 205 Id. Westboro dubbed the event the “Vintage Massacre” and began to picket the Vintage 
Restaurant every day thereafter. Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 5 Arrested for Attacks on Anti-Gay Protesters at Military Funeral, FOXNEWS.COM (May 
22, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/05/22/5-arrested-for-attacks-on-anti-gay-
protesters-at-military-funeral/. 
 208 Id. The counter-protester, David Jones, was convicted of third-degree assault and one 
count of disorderly conduct. Id. 
 209 Id. Three counter-protesters were convicted of criminal mischief and disorderly conduct 
for their actions. Id. A sixteen-year-old counter-protester was also convicted of criminal 
mischief for slashing tires on Westboro’s rented van. Id. 
 210 Tim Potter, Veteran Now Faces Felony Conspiracy Charge, WICHITA EAGLE (Dec. 4, 
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.kansas.com/2010/12/04/1617714/vet-now-faces-felony-
conspiracy.html. 
 211 Id. Newell received a “great outpouring of support” from around the U.S., with many 
offers to support him with donations to fund his defense. Id. 
 212 See Martha Quillin, N.C. Backs Suit Against Church That Pickets Military Funerals, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (June 5, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/06/05/515804/nc-
supports-suit-against-church.html. 
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breaking through the group’s line.213Apparently, the Westboro member was 
“repeatedly pushed and ha[d] his shirt torn off” before the police were able to separate 
him from the crowd by using pepper spray.214 In August 2010, Westboro protesters 
were accosted while protesting the funeral of Marine Staff Sergeant Michael Bock in 
Omaha, Nebraska.215 A man enraged with the Westboro protest drove by in his truck 
and sprayed mace on the Westboro members.216 Outside of the Republican National 
Convention in August 2012, Westboro members had to be escorted away from angry 
crowds by police in riot gear following a “scuffle” with those opposed to their 
messages.217   
Though not directly indicative of the potential for violent reactions from those 
opposed to Westboro’s messages, it is worth noting a few instances in which Westboro 
members themselves have acted violently. In September 1993, a court convicted 
Westboro member Charles Hockenbarger of battery and criminal restraint stemming 
from his assault of a Lutheran minister who was counter-protesting a Westboro 
picket.218 In January 1995, a court convicted Benjamin Phelps, grandson of Westboro 
pastor Fred Phelps, Sr., of misdemeanor assault stemming from an incident in which 
he spit on a passerby during a Westboro protest.219   
The above incidents clearly illustrate that Westboro’s protest speech has a strong 
tendency to incite violent reactions from the public and from counter-protesters. In the 
absence of the protection of law enforcement, there is a high likelihood that Westboro 
members would suffer great physical injury at the hands of the angered public. The 
mere fact that law enforcement must be present is indicative of the expectation of 
violence. Indeed, even where police have been present in significant numbers to 
protect Westboro members, counter-protesters have still managed to break through the 
lines to assault Westboro’s protesters. From the above evidence, it is reasonable to 
infer that, especially in a vulnerable mental state such as that of Albert Snyder, 
Westboro’s messages targeted at grieving families of slain military servicemen or 
victims of tragedy could incite violence from the same. If Westboro’s speech could 
cause ordinary bystanders to resort to acts of physical violence, it is logical to presume 
that the same speech could just as easily, and perhaps understandably, provoke a 
violent reaction from family members of the deceased whose funerals Westboro 
protests. 
                                                                                                                                         
 213 Domestic Terrorism, supra note 204; see also Evan Hurst, What Happened When 
Westboro Baptist Decided to Protest in Joplin, Missouri?, TRUTHWINSOUT.ORG (May 30, 
2011), http://www.truthwinsout.org/blog/2011/05/16755.   
 214 Hurst, supra note 213. 
 215 Man Fires Pepper Spray on Protesters Outside Marine’s Funeral, CNN (Aug. 29, 2010, 
11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/08/28/nebraska.funeral.protest. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Mike Schneider, Westboro Baptist Church Members Clash With Protesters At GOP 
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In the wake of the Court’s decision in Snyder, Albert Snyder himself recognized 
the propensity for potential violence that the Court may have inadvertently created 
with its holding. Believing that “someone is going to get hurt,” Snyder opined: 
You have too many soldiers and Marines coming back with post-traumatic 
stress syndrome, and [the Westboro protesters] are going to go to the wrong 
funeral and the guns are going to go off. And when it does [sic], I just hope 
it doesn’t hit the mother that’s burying her child or the little girl that’s 
burying her father or mother. It’s inevitable.220 
3. Fighting Words Revitalization, By Renewed Focus on the “Words That By Their 
Very Utterance Inflict Injury” Prong, Would Allow Tort Recovery for Grieving 
Families 
In the wake of Snyder, Westboro’s leaders have vowed to “quadruple” the number 
of funeral protests it conducts, saying that Westboro members “have not slowed down 
and [they] will not.”221 Families will continue to be subjected to targeted Westboro 
cruelty at a particularly vulnerable point in time. Since Snyder appears to allow nearly-
absolute tort immunity for First Amendment speech which concerns matters of some 
public import,222 it leaves grieving families such as the Snyders without manner of 
recourse against those who would perpetrate undue emotional distress against them. 
Because Westboro has vowed to continue its prolific protesting activities at funerals, 
it is doubtless that more severe mental injuries will be inflicted by its speech in the 
future.   
The Supreme Court has refused to add new categories of free speech absent a 
“longstanding historical tradition of treating the speech as unprotected.”223 As 
discussed in Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 above, the fighting words doctrine constitutes just 
such a “longstanding historical tradition,” and the Court continues to cite Chaplinsky 
and fighting words as a viable doctrine.224 The reason why, traditionally, fighting 
words have been categorically excluded from First Amendment protection is “not that 
their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a 
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea 
the speaker wishes to convey.”225 In contrast to past instances where the Court has 
declined to extend fighting words, such as the “fuck the draft” jacket in a public 
courthouse, or the use of “motherfucker” in various contexts,226 targeted opprobrious 
speech at a funeral is much more “particularly intolerable” and “socially unnecessary” 
                                                                                                                                         
 220 Fallen Marine’s Father Says Anti-Gay Pickets Will Draw Gunfire, CNN (Mar. 4, 2011, 
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as a means of communicating viewpoints. Westboro could still accomplish its protest 
goals through different means—that is, absent the specifically targeted elements of its 
speech—without injury to its First Amendment rights and without tortious injury to 
grieving individuals.227  
Private citizens at private funerals deserve protection,228 and where time, place, 
and manner restrictions on free speech do little or nothing to obviate the effects of 
targeted funeral picketing, these families deserve a means of recourse for the effects 
this picketing imparts. Revitalizing the fighting words doctrine with a narrow and 
limited application would render targeted messages at funeral pickets unprotected by 
the First Amendment, thereby exposing the speakers to liability and opening the door 
to tort recovery for grieving families who have been subjected to, and affected by, a 
targeted funeral picket.229 
There is a ready remedy to curb targeted speech at funeral protests, and this lies in 
the “inflict injury” prong of the fighting words doctrine. In its narrowing of the 
doctrine since Chaplinsky,230 the Supreme Court has neglected to focus on the “words 
which by their very utterance inflict injury” part of the doctrine, instead focusing 
almost solely on the “tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” prong.231 As 
such, the doctrine has focused mostly on retaliatory violence, providing greater 
protection to those who would respond with violence.232 It fails to account for the 
drastic mental effects that can be brought about by targeted speech. 
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 230 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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A solution would be to keep the fighting words doctrine intact, but with a renewed 
focus on the “inflict injury” prong of the standard. Focusing on this prong in a fighting 
words inquiry could allow tort recovery, such as for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, on the theory that targeted vitriolic speech inflicts injury and threatens the 
mental tranquility of the target.233 The Court has shown that the fighting words 
doctrine will almost exclusively be used to address speech with a potential for ensuing 
violence. Starting and ending the inquiry with whether words alone would actually 
cause a person to respond with violence oversimplifies the doctrine. It is necessary to 
examine why a person would desire to react with physical violence when confronted 
with targeted hateful speech.234 The tragic death of a family member causes significant 
psychological injury and a vulnerable emotional and mental state that, when 
aggravated and exacerbated by verbal abuse, can lead one targeted by that speech to 
respond with violence.   This violent response may be immediate, as the Court has 
focused on almost exclusively since Chaplinsky, but it very well may not be 
immediate.235 As Professor Wendy Reilly points out, “the build up of psychic harm 
[can] lead to violence at a later point.”236 Both the immediate response and the non-
immediate response are still physically violent reactions to injurious speech, which is 
the “same evil that the . . . current standard seeks to avoid.”237 
If the Court focused on the “inflict injury” prong, in the narrow instances in which 
it is presented with First Amendment speech on matters of mixed public and private 
concern (like funeral protests), this would allow the injured to be compensated for 
unwillingly enduring the speech and for the detrimental effects of the speech on his or 
her mental health. A focus on this prong would not open the floodgates to “punishment 
of a vast range of controversial speech,”238 because examining the injury caused by 
speech, in the narrow context of tort suits arising from speech on matters of mixed 
public and private concern, would not allow the state to regulate and punish this 
speech.239 It merely would provide a means for private redress for injurious speech on 
the matters of private concern; namely, the chance for a private individual injured by 
such targeted speech, such as Albert Snyder, to recover for the damages caused 
                                                                                                                                         
 233 See, e.g., id. at 980. 
 234 See id. 
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 236 Reilly, supra note 146, at 981. 
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supra Part II.B.2.   
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thereby. As mentioned in Part III.B.3 above, torts such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress have rigorous requirements that would still need to be proven for 
the injured to recover for the effects of targeted opprobrious speech.240 
The narrowed focus on “inflict injury” would be in line with the Court’s traditional 
categorical proscriptions of certain speech,241 its recognition that “not all speech is of 
equal First Amendment importance,”242 and the acknowledgement that the First 
Amendment does not provide a “special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of 
others.”243 Having a narrow application would not potentially “interfere[] with a 
meaningful dialogue of ideas,” because organizations like Westboro would still be 
able to engage in non-targeted speech on matters of strictly public concern on public 
land, without fearing tort liability.244 The threat of liability that would ensue from the 
refocus on “inflict injury” would not, therefore, run the risk of a “reaction of self-
censorship on matters of public import.”245 It would only risk a “reaction of self-
censorship” as to matters of private import; namely, speech targeted at grieving 
families during a funeral. 
E. Counterpoints 
Subjecting speech on matters of mixed public and private concern to tort liability 
under this narrowed and refocused application of fighting words could raise a concern 
regarding the assessment of damages, especially where the speech at issue is 
considered particularly hateful or offensive to civil society. Jurors would likely be 
inclined, as they were at trial in Snyder,246 to punish speakers with hefty punitive 
damages simply because the jurors disagree with the ideas being expressed. This 
would be contrary to the goal of this Note, in that it would more so serve to punish 
speech than to provide a balance of First Amendment and privacy interests. To prevent 
this potential outcome, punitive damages should not be an available remedy where 
targeted speech addresses matters of mixed public and private concern. Though this 
would be “contrary to current state tort law,”247 it would protect speakers’ First 
Amendment rights to the extent that their speech would not be egregiously penalized. 
Mandating jury instructions that exclude punitive damages would mitigate the 
potential harm posed to First Amendment speech by large punitive damage awards. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When the content and the inherent purpose of speech become immaterial 
from a legal perspective, freedom of speech may be abused in a manner 
which contradicts the basic principles of a free society. Speech by hate 
groups can be utilized to willfully inflict injury on the targets of hate, 
turning the freedom of speech into a defense of unjust action.248 
Because Westboro is especially prolific in its funeral protest activities and intends 
to continue with them in the future, and the Snyder decision did nothing to curb the 
specifically targeted messages within Westboro’s protest speech, injuries will 
continue to be inflicted on grieving families by the “church’s” targeted speech in the 
future. These families deserve privacy in their time of despair, and their deceased 
deserve the dignity traditionally accorded to them by the state and social mores. 
Where, as in Snyder, speech charged with such targeted vitriol is granted immunity 
from tort liability under the First Amendment, these families lack any remedy 
whatsoever for their suffering.   
Modifying the focus of the fighting words doctrine as outlined above and applying 
it to funeral protest speech on matters of mixed public and private concern would open 
the door to tort liability for injury caused by those specifically targeted messages of 
private concern. Allowing tort recovery for injury caused by targeted speech on private 
matters would not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the speakers, it would 
merely hold the speakers liable to private citizens who are able to meet rigorous tort 
elements and demonstrate severe injuries caused by the speech. Liability would not 
extend to any messages of purely public import. Allowing tort recovery in these 
instances would be in line with prior First Amendment jurisprudence, which dictates 
that not all speech is protected by the First Amendment, especially where it resorts to 
epithets or targeted personal abuse. Exposing speakers like Westboro to tort liability 
maintains a degree of substantive equality of rights—it balances the First Amendment 
interests of Westboro against the privacy rights of the grieving family, without 
summarily dismissing the importance of either. 
Westboro would still be allowed to protest in any manner it chose, but would not 
be able to hide behind the fact that its speech is “predominantly on matters of public 
concern” as a blanket immunity to liability for its specifically targeted messages. 
Westboro would thus need to adjust its protest behavior to avoid tort liability in the 
future, and could accomplish this by simply eliminating targeted website “epics” and 
messages that could be construed as specifically directed at the deceased and the 
grieving family. Westboro could still engage in a meaningful dialogue of ideas without 
targeting emotionally vulnerable private citizens. The overarching goal and theme of 
Westboro’s speech would not be adversely affected by eliminating the privately-
concerned elements; Westboro would still be able to relay its message regarding 
America’s immorality and tolerance of homosexuality without targeting specific 
individuals and grieving families. Exposure to tort liability would essentially coerce 
Westboro into self-censoring its protest speech, restricting it solely to matters of purely 
public concern. Taking it a step further, eliminating the privately-concerned elements 
of Westboro’s protests may have the effect of reducing media publicity for its 
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message, for Westboro’s targeted vitriol is in large part responsible for the public 
attention drawn to the church’s protests. 
Snyder may have further ramifications where tortious injury and First Amendment 
speech intertwine: if speech on matters of public concern can have an immunizing 
effect on liability in the funeral protest context, then one must wonder whether matters 
of public concern will be trumpeted in other contexts, as well, to immunize tort 
liability. For illustration, “if one were to defame an individual Catholic as a pedophile 
while protesting against the Vatican, or if one were to attack an individual Jew as a 
swine who rejoices at drinking Gentile babies’ blood while protesting the United 
States’ support for Israel, tort law could be legitimately invoked;”249 however, Snyder 
may very well allow the First Amendment to immunize the speaker in these scenarios. 
Revitalizing “fighting words” with a renewed focus on “words that by their very 
utterance cause injury” provides a potential solution to the problem Snyder created, in 
line with prior jurisprudence, that would not give rise to drastic negative ramifications 
for First Amendment speech protections.  
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